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The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New
Federal Role in Investor Protection
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has long been a matter of common knowledge that securities,
investment involves an element of financial risk. In addition to the
obvious hazards of injudicious investment, such as market decline and
failure of the corporate venture, there is an appreciable risk of financial
2
loss to the investor due to the potential insolvency of his broker-dealer.
Until recently it had been the policy of the federal government to restrict
its protection against this latter risk to measures designed to prevent
broker-dealer insolvencies and, when an insolvency did occur, to an
ordering of the priorities of customer claims in bankruptcy. In the last
session of the 91st Congress, however, a dramatic departure was taken
from this traditional federal policy. Disturbed by the financial distress in
the securities industry and dissatisfied with the traditional scheme of
federal protection, Congress enacted the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 19703 to insure investors against loss due to broker-dealer
insolvency. The purpose of this Note is to present a general overview of
this new remedial role of the federal government in the field of investor
protection. Specifically, the Note will examine the risks that precipitated
the legislation, the prior regulatory efforts to alleviate these risks, and
the scope and significance of the 1970 Act.
II.

THE SOURCE OF THE RISK

The dangers to the securities investor posed by broker-dealer
insolvency arise out of the custodial functions involved in the brokerdealer's business. There are three basic categories of assets in which the
1. The term "securities" is difficult to define in an all-inclusive manner. See, e.g., UNIFORM
SECURITIEs ACT § 401(1). For the purpose of general discussion in this Note, however, "securities"
will be used in its normal sense to mean negotiable stocks and bonds issued by a corporation as
evidence of corporate ownership or indebtedness. See P. WYCKOFF, DICTIONARY OF STOCK
MARKET TERMS 234 (1964).
2.
The term "broker-dealer" is used in this Note to refer to anyone in the business of
purchasing or selling securities. It should be noted, however, that this term ignores the technical
distinction between the functions of a securities broker and a securities dealer. A securities broker is
"[o]ne who acts as an agent . . . between the buyers and sellers of securities . . . and charges a
commission for his services." P. WYCKOFF, supra note 1, at 38. In contrast, a dealer is one "who
deals in securities as a principal. . . .A dealer buys from, or sells to, a client. . . whereas a broker
... Id. at 77-78. Whenever the discussion of this Note
buys and sells for the account of a client.
is applicable only to brokers or to dealers, the separate terms will be used.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636.
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customer has a property interest, 4 but which are in the possession of his
broker-dealer: (1) free credit balances; (2) fully paid securities; and (3)
securities in margin accounts. 5 The possession of a customer's property
by a broker-dealer exposes the customer to the risk that he may not be
able to retrieve his property if the broker-dealer fails. Moreover, even
though an investor might eventually be able to retrieve his property in
toto from an insolvent broker-dealer, he may still suffer financial loss
due to a prolonged freezing of his account in an adverse market. The
extent of these risks and the investor's ability to avoid them vary
according to the nature of the property that is left in the broker-dealer's
possession. For this reason a brief discussion of the three categories of
customer assets in broker-dealer custody is necessary.
A.

Free Credit Balances

Free credit balances are the amounts of cash, as distinguished from
securities, held by a broker-dealer for his customers but against which
the broker-dealer has no claim. 6 Typically, free credit balances may arise
in any of four situations. First, the customer may have deposited cash
with his broker-dealer in anticipation of making a purchase. 7 Secondly,
the broker-dealer may have retained the cash proceeds from the sale of a
customer's securities, either on express instructions from the customer
or because the customer has failed to give instructions for the disposition
of the proceeds.' Thirdly, the broker-dealer may have retained interest or
dividends that have been paid on a customer's securities that the broker4. This discussion of customers' assets follows the terminology used in SEC, REPORT OF
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 393

SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R.
(1963) [hereinafter cited as SEC SPECIAL STUDY].

5.

Technically, there is a fourth type of customer asset in the possession of broker-

dealers--cash equities against which the broker-dealer has a claim. As a practical matter, however,
these cash equities can be considered as payments to the broker-dealer on a debit balance owed.
Although these equities have not been used to reduce the customer's debt on the broker-dealer's
books, they can be withdrawn only after the customer has deposited their equivalent in more cash or
securities. For a discussion of this category of customer "assets" see SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra
note 4, pt. 1,at 397.
6. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1185 (1961).

7. Normally, a cash purchase is executed immediately, and no free credit balance would arise.
It is not uncommon, however, for a customer to deposit funds with a broker-dealer for a purchase,
with instructions to buy at a certain price or with advice that instructions will follow.
8.

It is the customary practice of most broker-dealers to seek express instructions from a

customer concerning the disposition of the proceeds of a sale of the customer's securities. SEC
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. I, at 396. In the absence of instructions, practices vary widely
concerning whether the proceeds are remitted immediately to the customer or retained pending
request. For a statistical sampling of these practices see id. at 396, table II I-e.
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dealer holds in street name.' Finally, a margin 0 customer may have

deposited cash with a broker-dealer in excess of margin requirements."
Although the amount of free credit balances held by any single brokerdealer will vary with the nature of his business, the aggregate amount
owed the investing public on these balances is quite large. On the New
held by member
York Stock Exchange alone, the free credit balances
2
firms currently total some three billion dollars.1
On the whole, free credit balances are highly desirable from the
standpoint of the broker-dealer. Most broker-dealers pay no interest on
the balances, and even those who do usually pay it at a low rate and only
to large customers. 3 Moreover, it is a generally accepted practice for
broker-dealers to use free credit balances in transactions for their own
accounts. 4 Although there may be some technical questions concerning
the legality of this procedure,' 5 as a practical matter it has been justified
9. Securities that are in "street name" are securities whose title is in the name of a recognized
broker-dealer. These securities are freely negotiable by delivery, and those held by one broker-dealer
in "street name" may actually be registered in the name of another broker-dealer. The purpose of
using a street name is, of course, to facilitate the handling of securities. See id. at 446, app. III-D.
When a corporation pays interest or dividends on the securities it has issued, the amount paid on
street name securities goes to the broker-dealer in whose name the securities are registered. When
the broker-dealer receives interest or dividends on a customer's street name securities, he may hold
the funds as a free credit balance, either on his own initiative or in accordance with the customer's
instructions. As in the case of cash proceeds from sales discussed in note 8 supra, most brokerdealers request instructions from customers on the disposition of interest and dividends; in the
absence of instructions, practices vary concerning whether the funds are remitted to the customer or
retained pending instructions. Id. at 396-97 &table III-f.
10. The word "margin" is used to describe various aspects of credit transactions in securities.
Thus, a "margin customer" is one who buys or sells securities on credit. These transactions on
credit are conducted in a "margin account." "Margin" also is used to refer to the amount of
collateral required in a margin account to secure the credit that has been extended to the customer.
In common parlance, a margin account that is adequately collateralized is said to be adequately
"margined."
11. For a discussion of the regulation of credit in margin transactions see notes 74-84 infra
and accompanying text.
12. Hearingson H.R. 13308, H.R. 17585, H.R. 18081, H.R. 18109, &H.R. 18458 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1970).
13. In a sampling of New York Stock Exchange members, the SEC found that less than onethird of the firms paid interest, and they paid it only on balances over a minimum size that varied
from $1,000 to $10,000. The interest rate varied from a low of 1%to a high of only 4%. SEC
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. I, at 395. The study also revealed that a far lower percentage of
broker-dealers outside the New York Stock Exchange pay interest on free credit balances, but this
may be partly explained by the fact that many firms hold very little in the way of free credit
balances. See id. at 394-95.
14. 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1185; SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 395-96.
15. See Mintzner v. Arthur L. Wright & Co., 263 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1959); In re Shapiro

Bros., 298 F. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); C. MEYER,
EXCHANGES § 40 (1931, Supp. 1936); RESTATEmNT

THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12, commentg (1959);
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on the theory that a broker-dealer is merely the customer's debtor and
not a trustee for the free credit balances.' 6 Thus, an investor who
maintains free credit balances is potentially in an extremely vulnerable
position."
It has long been recognized that the risk to the investor attending
the broker-dealer's possession of free credit balances can be effectively
reduced by requiring a physical segregation of all or part of the
balances.' In 1941 the SEC proposed that it be given the authority to
require by rule the total segregation of customers' free credit balances. 9
This proposal was vigorously opposed by the securities industry,
however, and was never adopted.2 In the Report of its Special Study on
the Securities Markets in 1963, the Commission carefully avoided the
issue of total segregation but urged that broker-dealers be required to
segregate a portion of their free credit balances into a reserve fund. 21 In
addition, the Special Study Report recommended that broker-dealers be
required to inform each customer regularly of the following matters: (1)
the amount of his particular free credit balance, (2) the fact that the
balance might be used by the broker-dealer, and (3) the customer's
unqualified right to withdraw immediately the full amount of his
balance.22 This three-prong recommendation was implemented in 1964
in substantially the same form as the Special Study Report had
suggested.23 Until the passage of the Securities Investor Protection Act,
I A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 12.10 (3d ed. 1967); Note, FederalRegulation of Over-the-CounterBrokers
and Dealersin Securities, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1237, 1272 (1946).
16. 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1185. In proposing the information requirements regarding
free credit balances discussed at notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text, the SEC stated that:
"Many customers of broker-dealers are not aware (1) that when they leave free credit balances...
with a broker-dealer the funds generally are not segregated and held for the customer, but rather are
commingled with the other assets of the broker-dealer and used in the operation of the business, and
(2) that the relationship between the broker-dealer and the customer as a result thereof is that of
creditor-debtor." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7266 (Mar. 11, 1964), reprinted in 29
Fed. Reg. 3477 (1964).
17. The position of the customer with free credit balances in the possession of his brokerdealer is especially vulnerable because of the confused requirements for specific identification of
cash under bankruptcy. See note 124 infra and accompanying text.
18. For an early government proposal that customers' securities and funds be segregated into
a central depository for all stock exchange members see Address of SEC Chairman William 0.
Douglas, before the Association of Stock Exchange Firms, May 20, 1938, in W. DOUGLAS,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 88-89 (1940).
19. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 399-400.
20. Id. For a history of the halting federal efforts to regulate free credit balances see 2 L.
Loss, supra note 6, at 1188-89 &n. 17; 5 id. at 3196-97 (Supp. 1969).
21. See SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 5, at 61.
22. Id.
23. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7325 (May 27, 1964), reprinted in 29 Fed.
Reg. 7239-40 (1964), codifiedat 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-2 (1970).
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however, the recommendation of partial segregation had not been acted
upon, and, with few exceptions, broker-dealers were under no obligation
to segregate any portion of customer free credit balances. 2
On balance, it should be noted that valid arguments can be made
against both the feasibility and necessity of requiring total segregation of
free credit balances.25 Furthermore, in the past 35 years the securities
industry has witnessed very few instances in which the potential for
financial loss flowing from free credit balances has actually been
realized. 2 ' Finally, it must be remembered that the investor can easily
eliminate his risk of loss by simply withdrawing the cash owed him from

the custody of his broker-dealer.
B.

Fully PaidSecurities

Fully paid securities are securities held by a broker-dealer in a
customer account but against which the broker-dealer has no claim.
Stated differently, fully paid securities are the non-cash counterpart of
free credit balances. Generally speaking, there are three basic situations
in which broker-dealers have possession of customers' fully paid
securities: (1) when securities are merely being processed for delivery; (2)
when securities deposited as collateral in a margin account exceed credit
requirements; 27 and (3) when securities are simply being held for
28
"safekeeping.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the Securities Investor Protection Act on SEC authority
to regulate free credit balances see note 131 infra. Three states and Puerto Rico specifically require
broker-dealers to segregate free credit balances, but these requirements are subject to broad
exceptions. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80-12 (1968), supplemented by Minn. Reg. 11.2, 2 BLUE SKY L.
REP.
26,611 (members of the American, Midwest, and New York Stock Exchanges exempted);
Colo. R. 2.44, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 9703, at 5606 ("compliance with the SEC rules and
regulations governing use, commingling, and hypothecation of customers' securities and free credit
balances shall be deemed compliance with this provision"); Ohio Reg. COs-I-07(E), 2 BLUE SKY L.
REP. 38,665 (applies only to broker-dealers who have failed to furnish adequate surety bond and
whose net capital is less than S 10,000 or 15% of his total indebtedness); Puerto Rico R. 12, 3 BLUE
SKY L. REP.
41,812 (members of American, Midwest, and New York Stock Exchanges
exempted). See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.13 (Supp. 1971) ("trust funds and items" placed with
broker-dealer must be segregated), supplemented by Iowa Sec. Div. Order No. 3, 2 BLUE SKY L.
REP. 18,634 ("items" include fully paid securities).
25. Recognizing the importance of free credit balances as an addition to broker-dealer
income, the SEC has stated, "It is apparent. . . that rigidly denying broker-dealers the use of such
balances would cause serious dislocation to a significant part of the securities industry." SEC
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 401.
26. See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the credit requirements for margin transactions see notes 74-84 infra
and accompanying text.
28. The term "safekeeping" as used in the securities industry merely means that the brokerdealer is holding fully paid securities beyond the delivery date. The term is not used to connote a
special degree of care. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1,at 446, app. 1II-D.
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From the standpoint of the investor, there are distinct advantages in
leaving fully paid securities with a broker-dealer. In the first place, the
broker-dealer gratuitously2 ' serves as a convenient and relatively safe
repository for security certificates. Moreover, the fact that an investor
leaves fully paid securities with his broker-dealer will facilitate future
trading by eliminating the necessity of physically delivering the
certificates to the broker-dealer before each subsequent transaction.
From the standpoint of the broker-dealer, however, customer fully paid
securities are not particularly desirable. It is generally recognized, for
example, that fully paid securities may not be used by a broker-dealer in
transactions for his own account?' In addition, while the retention of
fully paid securities probably tends to promote customer loyalty in
future transactions, it appears that this tendency alone would not justify
the expense to the broker-dealer of providing a gratuitous safekeeping
service if competing broker-dealers did not do so.3 1
The fact that broker-dealers are not free to use fully paid securities
in transactions for their own accounts makes each customer's exposure
to risk less extensive than it is with free credit balances. The individual
customer may further mitigate his personal risk by either registering his
securities in his own name,3 2 requiring the broker-dealer to segregate his
securities, or simply withdrawing his security certificates. Nevertheless,
the total potential loss on all fully paid securities in broker-dealer
custody greatly exceeds that involved in free credit balances. For
example, while the entire New York Stock Exchange membership now
holds some three billion dollars in free credit balances, the aggregate
value of customers' fully paid securities held by a single Big Board
member currently approximates eighteen billion dollars.3
As is the case with free credit balances, physical segregation of fully
29. Broker-dealers generally do not charge customers for the service of holding their fully
paid securities. Id. at 398.
30.

1 W.

BLACK, THE LAW OF STOCK EXCHANGES, STOCKBROKERS & CUSTOMERS

§

531

(1940). Securities are generally considered to be fungible, and broker-dealers are therefore not
required to keep specific security certificates in safekeeping for a customer. All that is required is
that a broker-dealer keep in his possession an amount of securities of the same series and issue as
those left with him by his customers.
31. See SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 398 &n.343.
32. This remedy may be impractical in some cases because of the lengthy delays frequently
involved in obtaining registration. Moreover, broker-dealers frequently request powers of
indorsement from customers carrying fully paid securities in their own names. Id. at 446, app. IIID.
33. Hearings, supra note 12, at 150. The total value of fully paid securities in broker-dealer
possession is commonly estimated to be approximately $50 billion. See S. REp. No. 91-1218, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
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paid securities can effectively reduce the customer's risk of loss.3 Unlike
the situation with free credit balances, however, significant progress has
been made in effecting a segregation. For many years the rules of the

principal stock exchanges have required member firms to segregate their
customers' fully paid securities.3 Similar requirements are imposed

upon members of the National Association of Securities Dealers by

NASD rules.36 There can be little doubt that the firms governed by these
rules hold the overwhelming majority of all fully paid securities in
broker-dealer possession in the United States. Broker-dealers not
covered by an exchange or association rule, however, are generally under
no obligation to segregate their customers' fully paid securities.37 Prior
to 1970, the Securities and Exchange Commission had made several
efforts to obtain the authority to establish a uniform minimum
segregation requirement for all broker-dealers holding fully paid
securities.3 8 It was not until the passage of the Securities Investor
Protection Act, however, that these efforts achieved fruition .3
C.

Securities in Margin Accounts

A margin account is one in which securities are purchased or sold
on credit.40 As used in this Note, the phrase "customer securities in
margin accounts" refers to those securities that arise out of a margin
transaction and in which the customer has a property interest that is
subject to the claims of his broker-dealer." These customer securities in
margin accounts may either have been purchased in the margin
transaction or pledged to the broker-dealer as collateral for the credit
34. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
35. E.g., N.Y.S.E. Rules 402.10-.90, 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE
2402.10-.90; see SEC
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 403-04 & nn.366-67 (segregation rules of the Boston,
National, Pacific Coast, and Pittsburgh Stock Exchanges). Segregation of excess margin securities
is generally not required until the market value of the securities exceeds a certain percentage of the
customer's aggregate indebtedness in the account. E.g., N.Y.S.E. Rule 402.80, 2 CCH N.Y.S.E.
GUIDE
2402.80 (140%).
36. N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 19(d); CCH N.A.S.D. MANUAL
2169(d).
37. A few states do require segregation of customers' fully paid securities. Many of these
segregation requirements, however, are subject to broad exceptions. In addition to the material cited
in note 24 supra, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.13 (Supp. 1971), supplemented by Iowa Sec. Div.
Order No. 3, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
18,634; Mich. R. 604.2(g), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 25,618, at
21,505; Puerto Rico R. 11, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 41,811.
38. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1188 n.17; SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at
402.
39. For a discussion of the impact of the Securities Investor Protection Act on SEC authority
to regulate fully paid securities see note 131 infra.
40. For a discussion of the uses of the term "margin" see note 10 supra.
41. For a discussion of the broker-dealer's lien see C. MEYER, supra note 15, § 65.
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extended in the transaction. The property interest of an investor in
securities in a margin account is clearly distinguishable from the interest
of a customer with free credit balances or fully paid securities in the
hands of a broker-dealer; the margin customer's securities are subject to
a general lien of the broker-dealer to the extent of the debit balance owed
on the account by the customer.4 2 Nevertheless, a margin customer has a

definite property interest in the securities in his account, and this interest
is exposed to a number of risks that accompany the possibility of
broker-dealer insolvency. Financial failure of a broker-dealer, for
example, might well mean that his margin customers will be unable to
retrieve the securities they have pledged as collateral in a margin
transaction. Moreover, when the margin transaction has been a
purchase, the insolvent broker-dealer may be unable to deliver the
securities purchased even though payment in full is tendered.4 3 Finally,
when the margin transaction has been a sale, broker-dealer insolvency

may force a liquidation of the short position 44 at a time when it is
economically undesirable to do so.
The risks of financial loss to the investor with securities in a margin
account are complicated by the rights accruing to the broker-dealer by
virtue of his lien on the securities. First, the broker-dealer may retain all

45
customer securities in a margin account until his lien has been satisfied.
Secondly, the broker-dealer can insist that these securities be carried in
street name rather than registered in the name of the customer. 4 Thirdly,
the broker-dealer has, as a matter of law, the right to hypothecate a
customer's securities in a margin account to the extent of the debit

balance owed by the customer on the account. 47 In addition to the
42. Id.
43. Generally a customer has a right to delivery of margin securities upon tender of payment.
This right is cut off at the institution of a bankruptcy proceeding, however, and the margin customer
only has a claim in the amount of his equity against the single and separate fund. See notes 118-19
infra and accompanying text.
44. A sale of securities on credit is commonly known as a "short sale." In a short sale the
customer executes a sell order for securities that he does not own. The broker-dealer secures the
purchase of the securities being sold short and delivers to the buyer securities obtained from some
source other than the seller. Generally speaking, the short seller anticipates a profit from the
transaction by obtaining the securities sold short at a later date and at a price lower than the original
sale. For a generalized discussion of the short sale see G. LEFFLER & L. FARWELL, THE STOCK
MARKET 219-37 (3d ed. 1963).
45. C. MEYER, supra note 15, § 65, at313.
46. Id. § 66. For a discussion of the term "street name" see note 9 supra.
47. C. MEYER, supra note 15, § 69. "Hypothecation" is the term used to describe the act of
pledging securities as collateral to secure a loan. See P. WYCKOFF, supra note 1,at 127. Frequently,
the term "rehypothecation" is used. A typical example of a rehypothecation arises when a customer
has pledged securities to his broker-dealer to secure a margin transaction, and the broker-dealer
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rights that derive from the lien on margin securities, it is a common

practice among broker-dealers to require margin customers to submit to
even broader control as a part of their margin account contractual
agreements. 8 Typically, these agreements authorize the broker-dealer to
commingle the customer's securities together with those of other
customers in a single hypothecation en bloc. 9 The broker-dealer is also
usually given the authority to lend the customer's securities to other
broker-dealers to the extent of the amount owed by the customer on the
securities .50
It is readily apparent that the broker-dealer has extremely broad
powers to use customer securities in margin accounts. The breadth of
these powers, however, can be justified not only on the ground that the
broker-dealer has a claim against the securities, but also on the ground

of practical necessity in financing margin transactions. 51 Furthermore,
these powers are subjected to extensive regulation.
The most important restrictions on the scope of broker-dealer

authority over margin account securities are the SEC rules relating to
the hypothecation of customers' securities.5 2 There are three basic

prohibitions in these rules. First, a broker-dealer may not commingle a
customer's securities with those of other customers unless each customer
has previously consented in writing.53 Secondly, no broker-dealer may
hypothecate a customer's securities in a manner that would permit a
commingling with securities belonging to anyone other than a bona fide
customer of the broker-dealer.-" Thirdly, broker-dealers are prohibited
repledges, or rehypothecates, the securities to a bank as collateral for a loan to finance the margin
transaction.
48. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 390-91. For sample forms of margin account
contractual agreements see G. LEFFLER & L. FARWELL, supra note 44, at 340, figure 20-3; SEC
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 444-45, app. III-C.
49. See G. LEFFLER & L. FARWELL, supra note 44, at 340, figure 20-3; SEC SPECIAL STUDY,
supra note 4, pt. 1, at 444, app. III-C. A broker-dealer frequently commingles several customers'
securities in a single block hypothecation because the bank loan to the broker-dealer usually is made
in an amount far larger than the value of any single customer's securities that are available for
hypothecation. Customarily, these bank loans are in multiples of $100,000.
50. See G. LEFFLER & L. FARWELL, supra note 44, at 340, figure 20-3; SEC SPECIAL STUDY,
supra note 4, pt. 1, at 391, 445, app. III-C. A loan of securities must be distinguished from an
hypothecation of securities. When securities are hypothecated, they are pledged as collateral for a
loan, and the primary obligation is on the pledgor to repay the loan. When securities have been
loaned, the borrower usually pledges to the lender an amount of cash equal to the value of the
securities borrowed, and the primary obligation is on the borrower of the securities to return them
on demand.
51. See, e.g., C. MEYER, supra note 15, § 69, at 331.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-1 (1970).
53. Id. § 240.15c2-1(a)(l).
54. Id. § 240.15c2-1(a)(2).
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from hypothecating customers' securities to secure an amount in excess
of the total owed to the broker-dealer by all his customers.55 In addition
to the SEC regulation of hypothecation, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 forbids any member of a national securities exchange and any

broker-dealer who transacts business in securities through the medium
of an exchange member from lending a customer's securities without the
written consent of the customer. 56 Although the foregoing restrictions on
hypothecation and lending of customers' securities have been viewed by
the Commission as "generally satisfactory to the extent of their
protection, ' 57 the principal stock exchanges and the NASD have
supplemented these restrictions with somewhat more stringent rules of

their own.58
III.

PRIOR PROTECTION AGAINST BROKER-DEALER INSOLVENCIES

A.

FederalRegulation and the Self-Regulatory Scheme

Federal regulation59 of the securities industry is based on a
combination of direct governmental supervision and industry self55. Id. §240.15c2-1(a)(3).
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
57.

§ 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78h(d) (1964).

SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. I, at 405.

58. E.g., A.S.E. Rule 412, 2 CCH A.S.E. GUIDE T 9432 (regardless of consent, member may
not pledge a customer's securities in an amount that is unreasonable in view of the indebtedness of
the customer); N.Y.S.E. Rule 402(a), 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE
STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1. at 405-06.

2402(a) (same); see SEC SPECIAL

59. Although this Note discusses only federal and voluntary industry measures for the
protection of securities investors, it should be noted that almost every state has blue sky laws
regulating certain aspects of securities transactions. Historically, these state laws sought to prevent
the distribution of fraudulent securities by requiring registration of securities sold within the state
and of those persons involved in their issuance. See L. Loss & E. CowETr, BLUEa SKY LAW 1-10
(1958). Today, the blue sky laws typically contain one or more of 3 basic regulatory provisions: (1)
general prohibitions against fraud; (2) registration requirements for securities; and (3) registration
requirements for certain persons engaged in the securities business. Id. at 19. Although the first 2 of
these provisions have little relevance to the problem of protecting securities investors against brokerdealer insolvency, the state requirements for broker-dealer registration relate directly to the issue of
financial responsibility. Virtually every state, for example, requires registered broker-dealers to post
a surety bond and to file annual financial reports. See, e.g., UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §§ 202(e),
203(b) (the Uniform Securities Act has been adopted in 25 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia (see

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,

1969

193)). Many states also require registered broker-dealers to maintain a minimum net
capital or net capital to aggregate indebtedness ratio. See, e.g., UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 202(d)
& Commissioners' Note; L. Loss &E. CoWiT, supra, at 265-66. Although many of the state blue
sky requirements copy the standards set by federal law (see, e.g., UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 203,
Commissioners' Note), few state requirements are stricter than their federal counterparts. L. Loss
& E. CowEr, supra, at 43. But see notes 24 &37 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, the
state machinery for enforcing broker-dealer financial responsibility is generally far less extensive
than the federal regulatory scheme. L. Loss &E. CowETT, supra,at 57-62.
HANDBOOK
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regulation. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires broker-dealers

who conduct nonexempt interstate businesses in securities other than on
a national securities exchange to register with the SEC and to comply
with the Commission's rules and regulations." The Act permits any
national securities association and national securities exchange to apply

for registration with the SEC.6' If a broker-dealer is not a member of a
national exchange or association, he is subject to direct regulation by the
SEC. 62 If, on the other hand, the broker-dealer is a member of a national
exchange, he is not required to register individually with the
Commission, and, in large part, the rules and enforcement procedures of
the exchange are substituted for those of the SEC.Y Similarly, members
of the National Association of Securities Dealers, the only national
securities association currently registered with the S EC, are provided a
certain degree of self-regulatory discretion." While the self-regulated
bodies of the securities industry have by no means been given unlimited
autonomy,6 5 the success of the system of self-regulation depends
60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1964).
61. Id. §§ 6, 15A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-3.
62. Id. § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c).
63. The basic source of authority for direct SEC regulation of broker-dealers is § 15(c) of the
1934 Act, which expressly exempts broker-dealers who conduct their business on a national
securities exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1964). In the place of this authority the SEC is given
control over the national exchanges' self-regulation. Id. §§ 6(b)-(d), 15 US.C. §§ 78f(b)-(d); see
Note, Protection of Accounts of Stockbrokerage Customers, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1290, 1291 (1964).
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 makes an important alteration to § 15(c)(3) of the
1934 Act by deleting the exemptions for national exchange members from the SEC financial
responsibility rules. See note 131 infra and accompanying text.
64. Members of national securities associations are permitted to register with the SEC under
§ 15A of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964) (enacted as the Maloney Act of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat.
1070). Unlike members of national securities exchanges, members of registered national
associations of securities dealers are not expressly exempted from the direct regulatory authority of
the SEC. Nevertheless, under § 15A the NASD is permitted by the SEC to police and discipline its
members to a large degree. The rationale for allowing this partial self-regulation is to provide a
body that can police members' compliance with minimum ethical standards as well as minimum
legal requirements. L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1361. For a detailed discussion of the structure and
operation of the NASD's self-regulatory authority see Rutter, The National Association of
Securities Dealers: Continuing Government-Industry Cooperative Regulation in the Over-theCounter Securities Industry, 7 VILL. L. REv. 611 (1962). See also Comment, Over-the-Counter
Trading and the Maloney Act, 48 YALE L.J. 633 (1939). In addition to the qualified measure of
autonomy, there are financial inducements for an unaffiliated broker-dealer to join NASD. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(i)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(i)(1) (1964) (registered securities
association may set prices at which members may deal with nonmembers).
65. The SEC, for example, has the general authority to require any national exchange or
securities association to repeal, amend, or alter its rules as the Commission may deem necessary.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15A(k), 19(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(k), 78s(b) (1964).
Furthermore, any national exchange or securities association may have its registration revoked by
the SEC, and any single member may be suspended by the Commission. Id. §§ 15A(/), 19(a), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(l), 78s(a).
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primarily upon the industry's assumption of a large measure of
voluntary responsibility. As a noted former chairman of the SEC has
observed, if voluntary responsibility is exercised, there are two basic
advantages to self-regulation:
First, it [permits] the necessary elasticity required because of varying conditions on
the various exchanges [and associations]. And second. . . it [adds] the weight of the
exchange [or association] itself as an enforcement agency having jurisdiction over its
own members.u

Within the framework of self-regulation, federal protection of the
securities investor from financial loss due to the insolvency of brokerdealers has been limited to measures designed to prevent insolvencies. In
addition to the previously discussed efforts to restrict the broker-dealer's
use of customer assets, 7 there are three basic regulatory measures
designed to prevent broker-dealer financial irresponsibility. Specifically,
these measures govern financial reporting and examination, extension of
credit by broker-dealers, and the amount of net capital maintained by
broker-dealers.
1. FinancialReporting and Examination.-The Securities and
Exchange Commission requires every registered broker-dealer and all
members of a national securities exchange who transact business directly
with nonmembers to keep a detailed set of specified books and records."
In addition, the SEC requires each broker-dealer and exchange member
to file a certified annual report of its financial condition.'5 These annual
financial statements must follow the form provided by the SEC and
conform to prescribed standards. 70 The financial reports are
supplemented by surprise audits conducted by the SEC, NASD, and the
national exchanges.7 Any registered broker-dealer or exchange member
who refuses to permit an audit may be suspended from conducting his
business by the SEC. 72 Generally speaking, the requirements for
financial reporting and surprise audits have proven quite satisfactory.
66.

W. DouGi.Ls, supra note 13, at 65-66.

67. For a discussion on segregation of free credit balances see notes 18-26 supra and
accompanying text. For a discussion on segregation of fully paid securities see notes 34-38 supra
and accompanying text. For a discussion on hypothecation of customers' securities see notes 52-58
supra and accompanying text.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a) (1970). For a discussion of these bookkeeping rules see 2 L.
Loss, supra note 6, at 1344-46, and 5 id. at 3407-12 (Supp. 1969).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1970). For a discussion of the SEC's financial reporting
requirements see 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1346-55, and 5 id. at 3413-32 (Supp. 1969).
70. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-5(a), (b) (1970).
71. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1356-57; 5 id. at 3432-33 (Supp. 1969).
72. Tobey Royalties Co., 26 S.E.C. 442 (1947).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

The effectiveness of the reporting and surprise audits, however, is
necessarily dependent upon the staff and budget of the Commission
itself. 73
2. Extension of Credit by Broker-Dealers.-The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 requires the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe
rules and regulations to govern the amount of credit that may be
extended on registered securities.74 Under Regulation T, the Federal
Reserve Board forbids broker-dealers from effecting a transaction for a
customer in a margin account 75 that creates or increases an excess of the
customer's "adjusted debit balance ' 76 over the "maximum loan
value" 77 of the securities in the account. 78 If within five days a customer
fails to make a deposit of cash or securities sufficient to prevent the
creation or increase of an excess debit balance, the broker-dealer is
required to sell the amount of securities purchased in the transaction that

73. An example of this limitation is seen in the audit system in which economic necessity has
forced the SEC to rely extensively on the financial inspection programs of the NASD and the
principal exchanges. See note 70 supra and accompanying text; Hearings on Securities Acts
Amendments Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Financeof the House Comm. on Interstate &
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84 (1959). For a description of the NASD member
inspection program see SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 4, at 647-59. For a discussion of the
NYSE member surveillance see id. at 519-21.
74. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1964).
75. The basic credit requirements of Regulation T apply to general accounts, and the term
"general account" is defined to include all customer margin accounts. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(a) (1970).
"Special accounts," such as customer cash accounts and omnibus accounts for other brokerdealers, are exempted from these basic credit requirements. Id. § 220.4. Exempted special accounts,
however, must be scrupulously separated from general accounts and may not be used "in any way
for the purpose of evading or circumventing any of the provisions of [Regulation T]." Id.
§§ 220.4(a)(2), (3). For a discussion of the regulation of special customer accounts see 2 L. Loss,
supra note 6, at 1252-56; 5 id. 3267-73 (Supp. 1969).
76. A customer's adjusted debit balance is essentially the total amount owed by the customer
to his broker-dealer. In the case of a margin purchase the debit balance, excluding commissions and
other charges, is simply the price paid for the securities purchased on margin. When the transaction
has been a short sale, however, the customer owes the broker-dealer the amount of securities sold
plus commissions and charges. Thus, a short seller's debit balance will vary with the market price of
the securities owed the broker-dealer. For a discussion of the short sale see note 44 supra.
77. The maximum loan value that a broker-dealer may allow on a security is expressed by the
Federal Reserve Board as a percentage of the security's current market value. This percentage is
more commonly known by the name of its complement, the initial margin requirement. Thus, for
example, the current maximum loan value for equity securities in a general account is 35%. 12
C.F.R. § 220.8(a)(1) (1970), as amended by 35 Fed. Reg. 7376 (1970). This results in a 65% initial
margin requirement for general accounts. Equity securities that are neither listed on a national
exchange nor granted special recognition by the SEC or the Federal Reserve Board have no loan
value under Regulation T. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.2(d)-(g), .3(c)(2) (1970).
78. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(b)(1) (1970). The credit requirements of Regulation T may be
expressed best in terms of an example: I opens a general account with B-D by purchasing on margin
1,000 shares of XYZ stock at $10 per share. Disregarding commissions and other charges, l's debit
balance on the account is $10,000, the purchase price of the XYZ. Assuming a maximum loan rate

INVESTOR PROTECTION

1971]

is necessary to liquidate the excess debit balance created.7 ' The Federal
Reserve Board, however, does not make any requirement for margin
accounts that become undermargined when there has been no
of 20%, the maximum loan value of the securities in l's account is $2,000 (20% x $10,000 worth of
XYZ). To avoid creating an excess of debit balance over maximum loan value in his account, I must
deposit S8,000 in cash, or an amount of securities with a loan value of $8,000.
less
less

$I0,000
2,000
8,000
8,000

Debit Balance in I's Account
Maximum Loan Value of Securities in l's Account
Excess of Debit Balance Before Deposit
Cash (or securities loan value)

No Excess Created
As one might expect, the credit requirements for short sales operate in reverse of those for margin
purchases. Under Regulation T, the Federal Reserve Board prohibits any broker-dealer from
effecting a short sale for a customer unless the customer deposits an amount of cash or securities
equal in value to a specific percentage of the market value of the securities sold. Id. § 220.3(d)(3).
For example, S opens a general account with B-D by selling 1,000 shares of XYZ short at $10 per
share. Disregarding commissions and assuming a margin rate of 80%, S's debit balance on the
account is S 10,000 (the current market value of the securities sold short) plus $8,000 (the 80% initial
margin requirement times the current market value of the securities sold short), or $18,000. This
debit balance is set off against the $10,000 in proceeds of the short sale. To avoid creating an excess
of debit balance over maximum loan value, therefore, S must deposit $8,000 in cash or securities
with a loan value of $8,000.

plus
less
less

$10,000 Debit Balance in S's Account
8,000 Short Sale Margin Requirement
18,000 Excess Debit Balance
10,000 Proceeds of the Short Sale
8,000 Excess Before Deposit
8,000 Cash (or securities loan value)
No Excess Created

79. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(e) (1970). With reference to the margin purchase example in note 78
supra, assume that I deposits only one-half of his $8,000 initial margin requirement. To eliminate
the excess of adjusted debit balance over maximum loan value in l's account, B-D would be required
to sell one-half of 's shares of XYZ (assuming no change in market value).

less
less
less

S 10,000
4,000
6,000
5,000

Debit Balance in I's Account
Cash Deposit (or securities loan value)
Excess
Proceeds from B-D's Sale of 500 Shares off's XYZ stock

1,000 Excess
1,000 Loan Value of I's remaining 500 Shares of XYZ
No Excess Created
(Footnote 79. cont.)
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"transaction." 80 Ifa customer sells securities in an undermargined
account, the broker-dealer is required to retain a percentage of the
proceeds known as the retention requirement .8 Similarly, a withdrawal

of cash or securities from a margin account may be made only if it does

not exceed the Federal Reserve Board retention requirement. 82 By
varying the maximum loan values allowed on securities, the Federal
Reserve Board maintains an effective and flexible control over the
amount of credit extended to customers by broker-dealers. 3
Furthermore, the rules of many of the national exchanges provide even
greater controls against the overextension of credit by member firms.,
3. Net Capital Requirements.-The Securities and Exchange
Commission requires all broker-dealers, unless exempted, to maintain
a minimum "net capital" of five thousand dollars8 6 and a ratio of "net
capital" to "aggregate indebtedness" of not less than one to twenty. 8
The "net capital" of a broker-dealer is essentially the total of his net
liquid assets, including the proceeds of adequately subordinated loans.n
In the case of a short sale there are, of course, no securities for the broker-dealer to sell. Instead, the
broker-dealer is required to purchase the amount of securities sufficient to prevent the creation of an
excess debit balance. With reference to the short sale example in note 74 supra, assume that S
deposited only one-half of his $8,000 initial margin requirement. To eliminate the excess of debit
balance, B-D would be required to purchase 500 shares of XYZ with the proceeds of S's short sale.

less
plus
less

$10,000
5,000
5,000
4,000

Debit Balance in S's Account
Market Value of Securities Repurchased by B-D
New Debit Balance
New Margin Requirement (80% x $5,000 securities)

9,000 New Debit Balance
5,000 Remaining Proceeds from Short Sale After Repurchase
4,000 Excess Debit Balance
4,000 Cash Deposit (or securities loan value)
No Excess Created

80. 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(b) (1970). An account that was once adequately margined may
become undermargined without a transaction either by a change in the market value of the securities
in the account or by a change in the maximum loan value rate set by the Federal Reserve Board.
81. Id. § 220.3(b)(2).
82. Id.
83. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1244-48.
9472; N.Y.S.E. Rule 431, 2 CCH
84. E.g., A.S.E. Rule 462, 2 CCH A.S.E. GUIDE
N.Y.S.E. GUIDE 2431.
85. Members who are subject to the net capital rules of the American, Boston, Midwest, New
York, Pacific Coast, Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington, or Pittsburgh Stock Exchange are
specifically exempted from the SEC net capital rule. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(b)(2) (1970).
86. Id. § 240.15c3-I(a).
87. Id.
88. Seeid. § 240.153-1(c)(2).
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To the extent that the liquid assets consist of securities, however, they
must be adjusted downward in value by a percentage fixed according to
their classification." The "aggregate indebtedness" of a broker-dealer is
basically the total of the cash liabilities that are neither adequately
collateralized by his own assets nor physically segregated from his
personal accounts.90 Aggregate indebtedness also includes loans made to
the broker-dealer that are not adequately subordinated to customer
claims. Liabilities of the broker-dealer on open contractual
commitments, however, are not included in the computation of
aggregate indebtedness." l
The SEC net capital rules specifically exempt members of the
principal stock exchanges, who are governed instead by the rules of their
respective exchange.12 In terms of the formal requirements, the rules of
the exempt exchanges tend to be more stringent than those of the SEC.
Occasionally, these rules will require a higher ratio of net capital to
aggregate indebtedness than is required by the SEC.' 3 Similarly, many of
the exchanges require that members maintain a larger minimum net
capital than the five thousand dollars required by the SEC.'" Certain
exempted exchanges also require greater downward adjustments in the
valuation of particular types of securities included in the members' net
capital computation. 5 In addition to these formal requirements, the
informal policies of the exchanges in policing members' net capital
further strengthen the overall net capital requirements."
Although the system of regulating the net capital of broker-dealers
has not been changed significantly since its inception, there seem to be
indications that it could be substantially improved. For one thing, the
7
adequacy of the ratio of one to twenty has frequently been questioned.'
It also appears that in some cases the sanctions for violation of the net
89. These adjustments are referred to colloquially as "haircuts." The percentage reductions
from current market value vary from 5% for certain debt securities to a maximum of 30% for most
equity securities. Id. § 240.15c3- (c)(2)(iii).

90. Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1).
91.
92.

Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(v).
See note 85 supra.

93.

SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1,at 408 &n.384.
94. For example, the minimum net capital for members of the New York Stock Exchange
who carry accounts for customers is $50,000. N.Y.S.E. Rule 325(a), 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE
2325(a).
95. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 408.
96. Id. at 408-09.
97. Hearingson S. 2348, S. 3988, &S. 3989 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1970); Note, supra note 63, at 1297.
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capital rules may tend to induce a hesitant system of enforcement."
Moreover, it has been suggested that some limitations might be imposed
on the inclusion of the proceeds of subordinated loans in the

computation of a broker-dealer's net capital." This inclusion has
generally been justified on the ground that the proceeds are available to
satisfy customer claims. This argument, however, overlooks the
possibility that this source of capital may be impermanent and subject to

market fluctuations if it is in the form of subordinated debentures or

accounts. 1 Finally, it appears that the uses to which a broker-dealer's
capital may be put have been inadequately regulated. 01
B.

The Special Trust Funds: The Rise and Fallof Voluntary Industry
Protection

For more than 25 years after the entry of the federal government
into the field of securities regulation, insolvencies of self-regulated
broker-dealers were almost nonexistent, and the measures designed to

prevent insolvencies seemed clearly sufficient.0 2 With the failure of a
member firm of the New York Stock Exchange in 1960, however, the
self-regulating bodies of the securities industry began to show a
willingness to go beyond mere prevention and to offer restitution to
customers who would otherwise suffer loss due to broker-dealer

insolvency.1 03 Finally, in 1964, the New York Stock Exchange
voluntarily established a special trust fund to indemnify customers of
98. One sanction for net capital violation is suspension from trading. A suspension, however,
may force the distressed broker-dealer into an even more dangerous position. Note, supra note 63,
at 1297. For an account of this type of dilemma see Loomis, The Unbelievable Last Months of
Hayden, Stone, FORTUNE, Jan. 1971, at 114, 154.
99. Hearings,supra note 97, at 28.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. On the New York Stock Exchange, for example, there were only 3 member insolvencies
between 1934 and 1960, and all 3 occurred in 1938.2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1191.
103. The member firm that failed was DuPont, Homsey & Co. To avoid the embarrassment
of customer losses in the former member's liquidation, the New York Stock Exchange paid
$700,000 into the firm's receivership. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1960, at 1, col. 3; Wall Street J., Nov. 4,
1960, at 3, col. 1. The failure of DuPont, Homsey &Co. had been precipitated by defalcation on the
part of one of the firm's partners. This fact prompted both the New York and the American Stock
Exchanges to expand their member fidelity bond requirements to include coverage against partner
dishonesty. See A.S.E. Rule 330, 2 CCH A.S.E. GUIDE
9380; N.Y.S.E. Rule 319, 2 CCH
N.Y.S.E. GUIDE
2319. Furthermore, the New York Stock Exchange itself took out a fidelity
bond to give added protection to customers against fraud on the part of member firms. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1961, at 50, col. 2. Nevertheless, the President of the New York Stock Exchange warned
that the indemnification of DuPont, Homsey's customers "could not be a precedent binding the
exchange to a similar course in the future." Wall Street J., Nov. 21, 1960, at 26, col. 2.
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member firms that failed. 0 4 This unprecedented step met with
widespread popular approval'0 and was followed by the creation of
similar funds by other national exchanges. 10 6 For several years the
securities industry as a whole fared well, and the funds seemed to provide
more than adequate protection. 07 In 1968, however, the securities

industry entered into the most difficult two-year period of business it had
experienced since the depression. 0 8 Rapid growth in the volume of

trading in 1968 forced a precipitate and costly expansion in the number
of back-office employees and equipment used by broker-dealers. Then,
as the costly expansions seemed to be solving the "paperwork crunch,"
the volume of trading dropped off sharply, reducing the commissions
that were badly needed to pay for the hasty back-office enlargements. In

1969 broker-dealers of all sizes posted losses, and firms began to
disappear at an almost unparalleled rate. As liquidations forced heavy
commitments of the New York Stock Exchange's special trust fund,'"
the limitations of the industry's voluntary funds became apparent. First,
it was obvious that the amounts in the special trust funds were
inadequate." 0 Secondly, payments to customers out of the funds were
completely voluntary on the part of the exchanges."' Thirdly, each fund
was entirely controlled by the governing body of the exchange, and
rumors began to circulate about the propriety with which the funds were
104. N.Y.S.E. Const. arts. X, § 8, XIX, 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE
1458, 1841-42. The
creation of the Big Board's special trust fund was caused by the failure of Ira Haupt & Co. in the
wake of the "phantom salad oil swindle" of 1963. For an account of the incredible events
surrounding the swindle see N. MILLER, TiE GREAT SALAD OIL SWINDLE (1965). For a discussion
of the New York Stock Exchange indemnification of Ira Haupt's customers and the creation of the
special trust fund see 5 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 3199-201 (Supp. 1969).
105. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1964, at 20, col. 1.
106. E.g., A.S.E. Const. arts. VII, § 5, XIII, 2 CCH A.S.E. GuIDE
9060,9117-18. The
exchanges that have established special trust funds are the New York, American, Midwest,
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington, and Pacific Coast Stock Exchanges. Hearings,supra note 97,
at 10.
107. See 5 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 3201 (Supp. 1969).
108. See Wall Street J., Jan. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
109. As of April 14, 1970, the New York Stock Exchange had committed just over half of the
total amount of its special trust fund and more than three-quarters of the fund's liquid assets in the
liquidation of 5 member firms. Wall Street J.,
Apr. 15, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
110. See note 109 supra. In March 1970, a New York Stock Exchange staff study
recommended enlargement of the Exchange's special trust fund. As a result of this study, a blue
ribbon committee was appointed to "determine the appropriate size of the fund and ways to enlarge
it." Wall Street J.,Mar. 26, 1970, at 6, col. 3. While this committee was conducting its study, the
Exchange approved a loan of S30 million in standby credit to the special trust fund out of the
Exchange's general funds. Wall Street J.,June 15, 1970, at 15, col. 4.
11. 5 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 3200 (Supp. 1969).
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being used. 112 Finally, inadequate as the funds might be, customers of
broker-dealers who were not members of one of the protected exchanges
were afforded no protection.13 It was against this background of special

trust fund inadequacy and general industry distress that Congress
enacted the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.114
C. Section 60e and Stockbroker Bankruptcies
Before turning away from this discussion of pre-1970 investor

protection against broker-dealer insolvencies, it is appropriate to
examine briefly the special procedure for dealing with stockbroker
bankruptcies established by section 60e of the Bankruptcy Act.",
Section 60e was enacted in 1938 to effect uniformity in the treatment of
customer claims in stockbroker bankruptcies."' The section divides the
claimants against bankrupt stockbrokers into three classes: (1) cash

customers who are able to specifically identify their securities; (2) all
other customers; and (3) general creditors." 7 In a proceeding under
section 60e, cash customers who are able to specifically identify their
securities are permitted to reclaim their property." 8 All remaining
property held by the stockbroker for customer accounts is then
liquidated, and the proceeds go into a "single and separate fund" that is
112. These rumors intimated that the NYSE Board of Governors was exhibiting favoritism
in the use of the special trust fund assets. Bus. WEEK, Aug. 22, 1970, at 28. The rumors were
apparently based on the use of the special trust fund to make a subordinated loan to the ailing
member firm Hayden, Stone. See Loomis, The Unbelievable Last Months of Hayden, Stone,
FORTUNE,

Jan. 1971, at 114, 154-55.

113. The special trust funds were voluntary and covered only the customers of member firms.
When a firm held multiple exchange memberships, the fund of the larger of the exchanges covered
the firm's customers.
114. For an indication of the congressional concern over the securities industry's woes see S.
REP. No. 91-1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1970).
115. 11 U.S.C § 96(e) (1964).
116. Section 60e was enacted in 1938 as part of the Chandler Act. Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 870. Prior to the enactment of § 60e, customer claims against a broker-dealer in
bankruptcy were subject to complex artificial distinctions; conflicting rules governing these
distinctions further confused the status of the claims. Gilchrist, Stockbrokers' Bankruptcies:
Problems Created by the Chandler Act, 24 MINN. L. REv. 52, 53-57 (1939); Legislation, The
Bankrupt Stockbroker:Section 60(e) of the ChandlerAct,39 COLUM. L. REv. 485-90 (1939). In the
words of the chief draftsman of the provision, "[Section 60e] has been added in order to make
uniform the rules applicable to the liquidation of the assets of bankrupt stockbrokers and to secure
greater approximation to equality in distribution.
...
Hearingson H.R. 6439 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1937). For a detailed discussion of the origin of
§ 60e see McLaughlin, Aspects of the ChandlerBill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. Cm. L.
REv. 369 (1937).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 96(e) (1964); 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
60.73 [1.2], at 1170-71 (14th
ed. 1969); Gilchrist, supra note 116, at 59.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 96(e) (1964); 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 117, at 60.74.
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eventually distributed pro rata to all other customers."' The personal
assets of the debtor also are liquidated, and the proceeds become part of
his bankruptcy estate, which is shared pro rata by general creditors and
any customers whose claims were not satisfied out of the single and
20
separate fund.
Although the basic scheme of section 60e seems relatively simple, as
a practical matter its application raises several problems. First, by its
own terms the section applies only "[w]here the bankrupt is a
stockbroker."' 2' In construing the meaning of this language, the courts
have occasionally been troubled by the technical distinction between a
broker and a dealer.1z Secondly, because of the unusual punctuation of
section 60e(2), it could be argued that the proceeds of customers'
property that has been rightfully transferred or unlawfully converted by
3
the stockbroker should not be included in the single and separate fund.a
Thirdly, inconsistencies in the statutory language raise considerable
doubt about the rights of cash customers to reclaim specifically
identifiable cash, as opposed to securities. 2 4 Finally, the practice of bulk
119. I1U.S.C. § 96(e)(2) (1964). When the stockbroker has pledged margined securities and
the pledge is liquidated by the trustee, the proceeds are distributed between the single and separate
fund and the stockbroker's general estate in proportion to the respective claims in the pledged
securities of the margin customer and the stockbroker. Id. § 96(e)(3).
120. Id. § 96(e)(5). The special provisions of § 60e only pertain to distributions to customers
of property held by the stockbroker for customers' accounts. The treatment of general creditors and
the distribution of the assets belonging to the stockbroker are handled under the standard provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act.

121.

Id. § 96(e)(1).

122. E.g., Gordon v. Spaulding, 268 F.2d 327, 330-32 (5th Cir. 1959) (when bankrupt had
dealt with claimant as a principal, § 60e did not apply despite the fact that bankrupt "conducted
his business regularly and usually as a stockbroker"). Commentators on § 60e have intimated that
a strict adherence to the distinction between the terms "broker" and "dealer" could result in a
subversion of the section's recognized purpose of uniformity. See Legislation, supranote 116, at 490
n.40. See also 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 117, 60.7311.1]. As a practical matter, this problem has
been minimized by the infrequency of litigation under § 60e.
123. The absence of a comma at the end of the clause excepting cash customers' specifically
identifiable property from the single and separate fund has led to this confusion. Section 60e(2)
reads in part: "All property at any time received, acquired, or held by a stockbroker from or for the
account of customers, except cash customers who are able to identify specifically their property in
the manner prescribed in paragraph (4) of this subdivison and the proceeds of all customers'
property rightfully transferred or unlawfully converted by the stockbroker, shall constitute a single
and separate fund ......
I I U.S.C. § 96(e)(2) (1964) (emphasis added). Scholars have
unanimously rejected the interpretation of § 60e(2) excluding proceeds of customers' property that
has been transferred or converted as inconsistent with the other provisions of § 60e and with
legislative history. 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 117, 60.73[2], at 1171-72; Gilchrist, supra note 116,
at 59-61. Apparently no court has adopted the criticized interpretation.
124. Section 60e(l) defines cash customers as those customers entitled to immediate
possession of securities without payment of any sum to the stockbroker. 11 U.S.C. § 96(e)(1)
(1964). Cash is not mentioned in the definition. Under strict application of this definition, therefore,
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segregation of customer securities and the development of an automated
central certificate service have created problems with the provisions

outlining the requirements for specific identification in section 60e(4).115
IV. THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 1970
A.

SIPC, the SEC, and Self-Regulation

The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 creates an
independent, nongovernmental corporation known as the Securities

Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).126 The SIPC is governed by an
appointive seven-man board of directors,'2 and the general membership

includes all registered broker-dealers and members of national securities
exchanges.Il 2 The Act charges the Corporation with two primary duties:
the establishment of the SIPC fund and the initiation of liquidation
proceedings whenever the customers of a member of the Corporation
need this protection. In fulfilling these duties, the SIPC is theoretically
an independent corporate entity. In practice, however, the Corporation
is completely subordinated to the discretionary powers of the SEC,12'
and, to a large degree, the independence of the self-regulated exchanges
cash customers would appear to have the right only to reclaim securities. For a discussion of this
problem see 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 117, 60.75; Gilchrist, supra note 116, at 71-79.
125. See 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 117, 60.74[2]; Gilchrist, supra note 116, at 68-70; Note,
Stockbrokerage Bankruptcies: Implementing CCS, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 750 (1969).
126. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 3(a), 84 Stat. 1637.
127. The 7 members will be appointed for staggered 3-year terms: (1) one director to be
appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury from the Treasury Department; (2) one director to be
appointed by the Federal Reserve Board from the Federal Reserve System; (3) three directors to be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate from the securities industry;
and (4) two directors to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate
from the general public. Id. §§ 3(c)(2), (4), 84 Stat. 1638.
128. Id. § 3(a)(2), 84 Stat. 1637. Broker-dealers whose securities business consists
exclusively of such activities as the sale of variable annuity contracts or the distribution of securities
to registered open end investment companies are exempted from SIPC membership. Id. Any
broker-dealer or national exchange member not automatically made a member of the SIPC may
apply voluntarily for membership. Id. § 3(f)(1), 84 Stat. 1639.
129. "The Securities and Exchange Commission is given in this [Act], plenary authority over
the Corporation's exercise of its powers and responsibilities." S. REp. No. 91-1218, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1970). See also H.R. REP. No. 91-1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. &AD. NEws 7390,7401-02 (1970). The primary source of SEC control over the SIPC stems
from Commission control over the bylaws and rules of the Corporation. Under § 3(e)(1) of the Act,
the SIPC is required to conduct its business pursuant to such bylaws and rules as it may adopt. All
bylaws and rules must be submitted to the SEC for approval, and the SEC is given the power to
require "the adoption, amendment, alteration of, supplement to, or rescission of any bylaw or rule
of SIPC whenever adopted." Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598,
§§ 3(e)(2), (3), 84 Stat. 1639. An especially important result of this power is that it gives the SEC
discretionary control over the general assessments that the SIPC levies against members. See id.
§ 4(c)(2); 84 Stat. 1640.
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and associations is preserved.'3 Thus, although the SIPC represents a
new factor in the federal regulatory formula, the relationship between
the SEC and the self-regulatory bodies of the securities industry has been
preserved virtually unchanged. 3 1
B.

The SIPC Fund and Member Assessments

As previously mentioned, one of the primary duties of the
Corporation is the establishment of the SIPC fund. Although this fund
is similar in nature to the industry special trust funds, 32 it avoids many
of the demonstrated weaknesses of these voluntary funds. The size of the
SI PC fund, for example, leaves little doubt about its adequacy. Starting
almost immediately at a level of 75 million dollars, the fund is to grow to
130. Members of registered national securities exchanges and associations of broker-dealers
are insulated from direct supervision by the SIPC. The Act expressly designates the governing
bodies of these organizations as the collection agents and examining authorities for their respective
members, Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, §§ 9(a), (c), 84 Stat.
1654. Although the SIPC may require self-regulatory bodies to file reports of the examinations they
conduct, these requirements are subject to SEC review. Furthermore, any extraordinary reports,
examinations, or required rule changes will be ordered by the Commission rather than the SIPC. Id.

§ 9(0.
131. The Act makes one important change in the relationship between the SEC and the
securities industry, but this change has little to do with the SIPC. The change increases the
rulemaking power and responsibility of the SEC by amending § 15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1964). In the 1934 Act, the rulemaking authority of the SEC
was couched in discretionary language: "[S]uch rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe ... ."(emphasis added). In amending this section, the Act deleted the word "may" and
sustituted for it the word "shall." Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598,
§ 7(d), 84 Stat. 1653. Section 15(c)(3) was further amended to eliminate the exemption of national
securities exchange members from the SEC financial responsibilty rules issued under this section.
See note 63 supra and accompanying text. Finally, the section was amended to clarify the authority
of the SEC to make rules governing the use of customers' fully paid securities and free credit
balances. Although the nature of these rules is generally left to the judgment of the SEC, a specific
mandate to require broker-dealers to establish reserves against free credit balances was included in
the amending language. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 7(d), 84
Stat. 1653; see S. REP. No. 91-1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1970). For strong language
directing the SEC to act vigorously in exercising this new authority see H.R. REP.No. 91-1613,91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 7390, 7402 (1970), and H.R.
CONF. R P. No. 91-1788, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
7417, 7420 (1970). For an SEC reaction to this mandate see 116 CONG. REC. S 21103 (daily ed. Dec.
22, 1970) (letter from SEC Commissioner Owens to Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the
Senate Banking & Currency Committee).
132. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation seems to have served as a useful precedent
in obtaining congressional support for SIPC. The FDIC even served as a model for some of the
early versions of the legislation. One early proposal followed the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Act so closely that the draftsman forgot to substitute the words "insured broker and
insured dealer" for the words "insured bank" in one section. See S. 2348, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 16(c) (1969). Nevertheless, the true ancestry of the SIPC lies in the voluntary special trust funds
and not in the FDIC. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 97, at 29.
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an optimum size of some 150 million dollars in liquid assets.133 The
liquid assets in the fund are backed at all times by a general borrowing
authority and a one billion dollar line of credit with the United States

Treasury.13 In addition, customer claims against the SIPC fund are a
matter of right,1 35 subject only to a maximum 50 thousand dollar limit
on claims from each customer's account. 13 Moreover, the fund is
controlled completely by an independent corporate body with a majority
of the board of directors having no direct connections with the securities
industry. 37 Finally, coverage under the fund extends to the customers of
all registered broker-dealers who were not covered under the voluntary
special trust funds.as
Financing for the SIPC fund will be provided by customer
assessments levied on the "gross revenues"' 3 of members of the
133. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, §§ 4(b), (d), 84 Stat.
1640, 1641. The initial $75 million level ofthe SIPC fund is expected to be made up of$18 million in
liquid assets and $65 million in confirmed lines of credit. The $10 million in liquid assets will be
drawn from an initial assessment on the industry of $7 million and a transfer of $3 million from the
industry special trust funds. It is anticipated that the $65 million in credit will be reduced by $10
million each year and replaced by liquid assets from member assessments. Assuming no member
liquidations and a 5% growth rate in the securities industry, the fund should total $150 million in 5
years. For discussion of the funding of SIPC see S. REP. No. 91-1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6
(1970); Hearings,supra note 12, at 182-85.
134. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, §§ 4(f), (g), 84 Stat.
1642-43.
135. See note 147 infra.
136. Advances will be made by the SIPC to satisfy claims of customers, except customers
who have a proprietary interest in the debtor or who are themselves broker-dealers trading on their
own account. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, §§ 6(f)(l)(C), (D), 84
Stat. 1651. These advances are limited to $50,000 per customer. This limit is reduced to $20,000,
however, if the customer's claim is for cash on deposit with the debtor. Id. § 6(f). The rationale
behind the lower limit on advances arising out of claims for cash was to avoid undesired comparison
with the $20,000 limit in FDIC claims. A customer who holds separate accounts with the debtor in
separate capacities is considered a different customer in each capacity for purposes of computing the
limit. Id. § 6(f)(1)(B).
137. See note 127 supra and accompanying text. As noted previously, rumors suggesting
misuse of the exchanges' special trust funds had been generated by the use of the New York Stock
Exchange fund to make a subordinated loan to a member firm. See note 112 supra and
accompanying text. A joint securities industry Task Force proposed that the SIPC be given
discretionary authority to make similar subordinated loans to SIPC members in lieu of initiating
liquidation proceedings. Hearings,supra note 12, at 178 (introduced as H.R. 18109,91st Cong., 2d
Sess. § 4 (1970), proposing new § 36(a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). This proposal
was included in a compromise bill drafted by the Task Force and the SEC. Hearings,supra note 12,
at 323 (introduced as H.R. 18458, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1970), proposed new § 35(m)(3) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The provision was deleted from the Act as finally passed,
however, apparently to avoid any suggestion of impropriety in the use of SIPC funds. See H.R.
REP. No. 91-1613, reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7390, 7404-05 (1970).
138. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
139. "Gross revenues from the securities business" is defined in the Act to include 11
enumerated items, each of which may be further defined by the SIPC. Securities Investor Protection
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Corporation. After consulting with the self-regulatory bodies'40 and
subject to SEC approval,' the SIPC has general authority to set the
rate of assessment for each member. The factors that the Corporation
may consider in levying assessments include the amount of risk the
member's business involves, the degree of probability that the risk will
be realized, and the ability of the member to pay. 142 The assessment rate
for each member, however, may not exceed one percent of the member's
gross revenues from the securities business for the period during which
the assessment is to be paid.1 3 Furthermore, whenever the annual rate of
assessment for a member exceeds one-half of one percent of the

member's gross revenues, the SIPC is required to make an affirmative
determination "that such rate of assessment . . . will not have a
material adverse effect on the financial condition of its members or their

customers .... 1" Failure on the part of any member of the
Corporation to pay his assessment when demanded by the SIPC makes
45
it unlawful for the member to engage in business as a broker-dealer. If
any member denies that he owes the assessment demanded by the
Corporation, he must pay the amount demanded and then challenge the
4
Corporation in federal court.'
C. Liquidation Proceedings
The second basic duty of the SIPC is to initiate liquidation

proceedings whenever the customers of a member need this protection.47
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, §§ 4(i)(1), (3), 84 Stat. 1644. Computation of a member's gross
revenues will be made by consolidating the gross revenue of all subsidiaries conducting a securities
business with the gross revenue of the parent. Id. § 4(i)(2), 84 Stat. 1651.
140. Id. § 4(c)(2), 84 Stat. 1640.
141. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
142. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 4(c)(2), 84 Stat. 1640.
143. Id. § 4(c)(3)(B), 84 Stat. 1640-41.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 10(a), 84 Stat. 1655.
146. Id.
147. The general authority of the SIPC to initiate liquidation proceedings is not couched in
mandatory terms, but rather the decision of when to initiate liquidation is left to the discretion of the
SIPC and the SEC. See id. §§ 5(a)(2), 7(b), 84 Stat. 1644-45, 1653. The discretion allows the SIPC
to refrain from immediately initiating liquidation proceedings whenever a member is in the position
of satisfying the conditions precedent to a liquidation adjudication. For a discussion of these
conditions see note 149 infra and accompanying text. Thus, the SIPC might temporarily refrain
from initiating liquidation proceedings even though a member was "in danger of failing to meet its
obligations to its customers" and was in violation of the net capital rule in order to permit an
attempt to effect a merger or some other arrangement that would bring the member firm out of
danger. This discretion is available, however, for determining only when the SIPC should act to
protect customers, and not whether it must eventually act. Although there is no procedure specified
in the Act by which a customer of an SIPC member can force the Corporation to institute a
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Because the SIPC has no direct responsibility in policing the financial

condition of its members, most liquidation proceedings will begin by a
notification of the Corporation by either the SEC or the member's selfregulatory governing body that the member is in or is approaching
financial difficulty. 4 ' If the SI PC determines that any member has failed

or is in danger of failing to meet obligations to its customers, and that
any one of five specified conditions exists, 4 9 the Corporation is
authorized to apply to a federal district court for liquidation of the
member.5 0 If the court finds that the Corporation's determinations are
correct, it will rule that the customers need the Act's protection and
appoint a trustee selected by the SI PC to liquidate the member.' 5,
The liquidation procedure provided for in the Act is essentially a
modified version of the section 60e stockbroker bankruptcy. 52 With few
exceptions, the court in a liquidation proceeding is vested with the
powers and jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court,153 and, with certain
limitations, the trustee in a liquidation is vested with the powers and title

of a trustee in bankruptcy. 5 4 The Act continues the section 60e division
of claimants into the separate classes of cash customers who are able to
specifically identify their property, all other customers, and general
creditors. In addition to being able to reclaim specifically identifiable
securities as under section 60e, however, cash customers also are
permitted to reclaim specifically identifiable cash from the debtor.1,,
liquidation proceeding, it would seem wholly inconsistent with the history and purpose of the Act to
say that the SIPC can refrain from acting when the obligations of a member of the Corporation to
its customers cannot otherwise be met.
148. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
149. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 5(a)(2), 84 Stat.
1644-45. The 5 conditions are that the member: (I) is insolvent; (2) has committed an act of
bankruptcy; (3) is the subject of a court proceeding in which a liquidator, trustee, or receiver has
been appointed for the member; (4) is in violation of the financial responsibility rules governing the
conduct of his business; or (5) is unable to make the computations necessary to show that he is not
in violation of the finanical responsibility rules governing his business. Id. § 5(b)(1)(A), 84 Stat.
1645. The broad scope of these 5 conditions is a significant improvement of the bankruptcy
provisions. As a practical matter, the purpose of § 60e of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(e)
(1964), has frequently been frustrated by the institution of a state liquidation or SEC proceeding
before.an act of bankruptcy had been committed. Note, supra note 63, at 1304-05. For a discussion
of the purpose of § 60e see note 116 supra and accompanying text.
150. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 5(a)(2), 84 Stat. 1645.
151. Id. §§ 5(b)(l)(a), (3), 84 Stat. 1645, 1646.
152. The Act expressly incorporates all of the general provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
except § 60e. Id. § 6(c)(1), 84 Stat. 1647. The language of § 60e, however, is copied almost
verbatim in the provisions of § 6(c)(2), 84 Stat. 1647-50, of the Act.
153. Id. § 5(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1645.
154. Id. § 6(b)(l), 84 Stat. 1647.
155. Compare id. §§ 6(c)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), 84 Stat. 1648-50, with It U.S.C. §§ 96(e)(1),
(2), (4) (1964). See also note 124 supra and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the manner in which customers may specifically identify their
property is broadened to alleviate the problems created by bulk
segregation and central certificate services.156 The concept of the single
and separate fund is continued from section 60e by the Act. In a
liquidation proceeding, however, the trustee is not required to liquidate
157
the securities and other property in the single and separate fund.
Instead, the trustee in a liquidation proceeding will distribute to the
customers from the single and separate fund, to the greatest extent
practicable, securities of the same class and series as those on which the
customer's claim is based.'- 8 In order to provide for prompt satisfaction
of customer claims, the procedure for proving claims has been
simplified, 59 and the time for making claims has been shortened. 60 As
under section 60e, customers share pro rata in the estate of the debtor
with the general creditors to the extent that their claims are not satisfied
out of the single and separate fund.'
There are two basic differences between a section 60e bankruptcy
and a liquidation proceeding that result from the availability of SIPC
funds in the liquidation. The first of these differences relates to the
mechanics of paying customer claims out of the SIPC fund. After the
appointment of a trustee in a liquidation proceeding, the SIPC advances
the amount of funds to the trustee that is necessary to satisfy the claims
of customers to the extent that the claims do not exceed the 50 thousand
dollar per customer limit." 2 To the extent that a claim is satisfied out of
SIPC advances, the Corporation is subrogated to the claims of the
customer." 3 The second basic difference between a section 60e
bankruptcy and a liquidation proceeding relates to the completion of the
debtor's open contractual commitments. While the completion of a
bankrupt's executory contracts is left to the unfettered discretion of the
156. Compare Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 6(c)(2)(C),
84 Stat. 1649, with 11 U.S.C. § 96(e)(4) (1964). See also note 124 supra and accompanying text.

157. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 6(b)(2), 84 Stat.
1647. See also note 119 supra and accompanying text.

158.

Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 6(c)(2)(B), 84 Stat.

1649.
159. Id. §§ 6 (g), (h), 84 Stat. 1651-52 (proof of claims required only of persons who are
associated with or have a proprietary interest in the debtor's business).
160. Compare id. § 6(e), 84 Stat. 1650-51, with Bankruptcy Act § 57n, 11 U.S.C. § 93(n)

(1964).
161. Compare Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 6(c)(2)(B),
84 Stat. 164849, with I I U.S.C. § 96(e)(2) (1964).
162. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 6(f)(1), 84 Stat. 1651.
For a discussion of the limits on customer claims see note 136 supra.
163. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 6(0(1), 84 Stat. 1651.
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trustee in bankruptcy,'1 4 the trustee in a liquidation is obligated to
complete open contractual commitments in which any investor has an
interest, unless the SEC should order otherwise.'" To expedite the
trustee's action, the SIPC will advance to the trustee the funds necessary
to complete these commitments.' 6 The theory behind this provision is
not that the position of the debtor's customers will be better protected,
but rather that the completion of the contractual commitments will
insulate other broker-dealers from adverse effects of the debtor
67
member's failure.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 represents an
important new addition to the federal role as protector of the securities
investor. By synthesizing the social policy of the industry's special trust
funds and the technical procedures of stockbroker bankruptcies into a
coherent and workable scheme, Congress has departed from its
traditional policy of preventive protection. As a matter of social policy,
the protection afforded by the SIPC seems clearly justifiable.'" As a
practical matter, the Act will virtually eliminate stockbroker
bankruptcies as far as customers are concerned'6 9 and replace them with
164. Bankruptcy Act § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1964).
165. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 6(d), 84 Stat. 1650.
166. Id. § 6(f)(2), 84 Stat. 1651.
167. S. REP. No. 91-1218, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1970).
168. There are 2 basic arguments supporting the entry of the federal government into the field
of insuring investors against the risk of broker-dealer insolvency. The first argument is that the
securities industry, as a means of routing savings into investment in private enterprise, is a national
asset. The SIPC, as a measure to protect the investor, could be viewed as merely a logical effort to
preserve this asset to the nation's economy. The second argument is that society has a legitimate
interest in protecting the consumer from risks he does not understand. The risk of selecting a losing
investment is commonly known and is directly related to the anticipated gain. The risk of loss due to
a broker-dealer's insolvency is not generally known, however, and it is totally unrelated to the
anticipated gain. As a hidden risk to the unwary investor, broker-dealer insolvencies are an
appropriate object of governmental protection.
169. For the customer whose claim is satisfied out of the reclamation of specifically
indentifiable property and the distribution of the single and separate fund, including advances from
the SIPC fund, the liquidation proceeding is the only action in which he participates. Although
customers whose claims are not so satisfied share in the subsequent disposition of the debtor's estate
in bankruptcy, it is estimated that 94.5% of the customers of SIPC members will be covered
completely by the $50,000 limit on SIPC advances alone. Hearings,supra note 12, at 340 (estimate
from study conducted for SEC). It should be noted, however, that the SIPC liquidation will not
necessarily reduce the claims with which general creditors will have to compete in the distribution of
the debtor's estate in bankruptcy. To the extent that customers have been satisfied by the SIPC, the
Corporation may participate in the distribution of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy as subrogee of
the customers' claims. Furthermore, an enormous dollar value of claims is concentrated in the
hands of a very few SIPC customers. Thus, it is estimated that while 94.5% of the customers who
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the faster and simpler operation of the liquidation proceeding. In short,
when the Act is judged on its own terms, it seems to be a successful and
desirable addition to federal protection of securities investors.
When the Act is measured in the broader context of securities
regulation as a whole, however, it is clearly a palliative and not a cure.
Although the Act significantly expands some of the powers of the SEC
relating to broker-dealer financial responsibility,17 0 the manner in which
these new powers will be exercised remains to be seen. Moreover, the
basic problems of broker-dealer back-office management have gone
completely unresolved.'17 There are indications that congressional efforts
to solve some of the more fundamental problems will soon be
forthcoming. 72 Traditionally, serious congressional action in the field of
securities regulation has come as a response to crisis in the industry. At
this writing, however, the securities industry seems to be steadily
emerging from the extended crisis of the last two years. 173 It is submitted
that the limitations of the protection afforded by the SIPC should be
carefully kept in mind, and that neither the creation of this new federal
protection nor the apparent advent of renewed prosperity on Wall Street
should be permitted to obscure the problems that remain to be solved.
ALLAN GATES
have accounts with SIPC members could be satisfied out of SIPC advances alone, the potential
value of the claims of the remaining 5.5.% of the customers amount to an estimated 92.9% of the
total dollar value of all claims in the liquidation proceeding. Id.
170. See note 131 supra.
171. For discussion of the unresolved problems of broker-dealer financial responsibility and
stability see Hearings, supra note 97, at 27-29. See also NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 1971, at 9-10;
Davant, Wall St.: You Get What You Pay For, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1971, § 12, at 28, col. 1;
Haack, Help for the Big Board, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1971, § 3, at 14, col. 3.

172. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 11(h), 84
Stat. 1656; 116 CONG. Rac. S 21109 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1970) (hearings to be held on further
legislation needed to improve federal regulatory effectiveness).
173. E.g., Robards, Stocks: Dam Is Holding, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1971, § 3, at I, coi. 3.

